An Analysis of Russia's Bounty for Identifying Tor Users: Fear Mongering or Practical Joke?
The recent news from the Russian government's official procurement website about offering a bounty to identify Tor users has sparked a mix of amusement and concern. Whether this is a practical challenge or merely a misguided effort, the underlying message reveals deeper intentions.
Historical Context and Propaganda
This initiative stands as a prime example of Soviet-era propaganda tactics, designed primarily to spread fear and doubt. The stated purpose of the bounty is ostensibly to identify Tor users for the government. However, historical context and recent events suggest that such an effort is likely aimed at intimidating the growing Tor community in Russia, rather than a genuine security concern.
The Moscow Times recently reported that in July alone, the number of Tor users in Russia surged from 80,000 to 200,000. This represents a significant increase, and it highlights the growing popularity of Tor among Russian citizens.
Fear-Mongering at its Core
The Russian government's effort to identify and potentially curtail Tor usage is a stark illustration of their heavy-handed approach to free speech. By offering a bounty of over 114,000 rubles (approximately $1,500 USD), they are hoping to appeal to the vanity of their citizens, suggesting that Tor users can be easily found and targeted.
The underlying message of the bounty is not credible. It preys on the ignorance of Tor users, implying that the complex and sophisticated nature of Tor makes it easy to crack. This is, of course, far from the truth. In reality, even if the NSA were somehow able to breach Tor, the rewards for success in such a complex task would be far beyond the offering.
Misplaced Fear and Fantasies
The idea that Russian teenagers, incentivized by this small sum of money, can suddenly develop a reliable decryption method that even the NSA struggles with is laughable. Even the hypothetical scenario of Joan Rivers shooting 4,242 hole-in-ones with day-old baguettes as driving irons while not complaining once is more probable.
The odds of this bounty leading to the development of a legitimate decryption system are astronomically low. However, the real question is whether the Russian government actually expects such a system to be developed. The more likely outcome is that the bounty will do little to impact the Tor community and, in the grand scheme of things, might just be a misguided and potentially entertaining attempt to scare Tor users.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Russian government's bounty for identifying Tor users is more likely a form of propaganda and a practical joke rather than a serious security measure. It serves as a continuation of their efforts to intimidate and control the free flow of information and dissent. The community of Tor users, both in Russia and around the world, remains largely unaffected by such attempts.